Domestic Crisis Response Plan Integration!


After 1991 I worked on an off officially and unofficially to assist in integrating the various plans that FEMA has signed on to or was responsible for development, implementation, and operations.   In the General Counsel’s office I can categorically state that I was the most knowledgeable about the various plans. although a chart used to promote integration was developed after I retired on October 1, 1999 I did help to create its predecessors. My objective was simple–in any domestic crisis whether in agencies, departments, the NSC or WH the same people always tended to show!

Today if there is a domestic crisis it is completely uncertain exactly what plans or SOPs will be involved. The most recent example of course is the BP catastrophic oil spill.

It should be repeated over and over that THE ROBERT T. STAFFORD ACT IS NOT THE GENERIC AUTHORITY FOR ALL RESPONSE PLANS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.

So in order to help track some detail on various plans I post the chart below and wonder exactly how many people in the federal, state and local government think they understand exactly who will show up, what training and expertise they have and experience, what funding will be available, and what systems and processes will be used, e.g. logistics or communications.  Obviously until such is known then the USA is not ready for any all-hazards catastrophic event. Despite what some might say!

Here is the chart:

APPENDIX I – Plan Reconciliation Analysis Matrix

Plan Features

NCP

FRP

FRERP

CONPLAN

  1. What is the basis of authority for the plan?  Are there any specific exclusions or limitations?
  • The NCP is required by:
    • Section 105 of CERCLA, as amended by SARA
    • Section 311(d) of CWA, as amended by OPA90
    • Authority delegated to EPA (and others) through E.O. 12777 (Sec. 300.2) and E.O. 12580.
    • The FRP was written per the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977 and the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 as amended by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief Act of 1988.
    • Requires a Presidential Declaration.
    • Contains a description of specific authorities for states and Federal agencies for particular instances (outlined in Section II A.).
 
  • Nuclear Regulatory Commission Authorization, P.L. 96-295 authorizes a national plan
  • E.O.  12241, as amended, delegates to FEMA responsibility for the plan.
  • The FRERP relies on agencies’ existing authorities.  It does not create any new authorities or change any existing ones.
  • Authorities include PDD 39, PDD 62 and Stafford Act.
  • The CONPLAN does not supersede existing plans or authorities that were developed for response to incidents under department and agency statutory authorities as stated in section II. C.
  • The Attorney General is responsible for ensuring the development and implementation of policies directed at preventing terrorist attacks domestically, and will undertake the criminal prosecution of these acts of terrorism that violate U.S. law. The Department of Justice has charged the Federal Bureau of Investigation with LFA responsibilities for the crisis management of a Federal response to terrorist incidents. The Attorney General will transfer the LFA role to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) when it determine it is appropriate.   As the lead agency for consequence management, FEMA will implement the Federal Response Plan (FRP) to manage and coordinate the Federal consequence management response in support of State and local authorities.
General Comments:
  1. These plans were developed for different reasons and with different mandates at different times.  As a result, integrating these plans would be difficult. Congressional action is likely to be necessary to the combine plans.
  2. All of the current plans have authorities that have allowed them to conduct successful operations.
  3. The NCP and FRP are based on statutes that provide the implementing agencies with specific authorities.  In contrast, the FRERP and CONPLAN rely on existing agency authorities.
Identified Gap/Conflict/Issue:

  • The plans serve the programs they were designed for, but gaps in their relationships exist.
Recommendation:

  • Develop a “One Plan” document that clearly lays out the relationships, reconciles the differences, covers the gaps, and bridges, but does not reinvent, the FRP, NCP, FRERP & CONPLAN.

 

Plan Features

NCP

FRP

FRERP

CONPLAN

  1. What is the applicability of the plan?  Are there any specific exclusions or limitations?
  • Can be used in response to chemical, biological, or radiological terrorist incidents.
  • Applicable to any discharge of oil in U.S. navigable waters, shorelines, etc. that could affect natural resources.
  • For releases of hazardous substances, pollutants or contaminants which may present danger to the public health or welfare of the U.S. as stated in the scope (Sec. 300.3)
  • Remedial authority does not apply to the following substances excluded from the definition of hazardous substance in CERCLA part 101(14): Petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise listed or designated as a hazardous substance under subparagraphs (A) through (F) of CERCLA part 101(14); and Natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, synthetic gas usable for fuel, or mixtures of natural gas and synthetic gas usable for fuel
  • Remedial authority does not apply to incidents excluded from the definition of a release in CERCLA part 101(22), including: Nuclear incidents subject to the financial protection requirements of the Atomic Energy Act; and Radioactive releases from the 22 processing sites designated in UMTRCA.
  • EPA policy excludes radioactive releases from facilities with a current license issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (40 FR 40658).   For DOE facilities that are not licensed or permitted by the NRC, EPA policy also excludes releases of radionuclides that meet the policies, guidelines, and requirements, and do not exceed limits, specified in DOE Orders.
  • The NCP references the FRERP in 40  CFR 300.130 (f) and states that most releases involving radiological substances are managed under the NCP, not the FRERP.  It also states [in 40 CFR 300.4059(f)(3) that notification for releases involving readiological substances should include EPA’s Radiological Coordinator.
  • Can be used in response to chemical, biological, or radiological terrorist incidents.
  • The FRP can be used for all major disasters and emergencies declared under the Stafford Act.
  • Section II.A. (Authorities), within the FRP describes its applicability to events outside the scope of the Stafford Act.
  • Developed specifically for response to radiological incidents, including terrorist incidents.
  • Within its scope, the FRERP covers any peacetime radiological emergency that has actual, potential, or perceived radiological consequences within the U.S., its territories, or possessions.
  • Applies to fixed nuclear facilities, transportation of radiological materials, satellites containing radioactive materials, Impact from foreign or unknown source, or other types of emergencies (Sec. I.C.)
  • Sabotage and Terrorism are considered “complicating dimensions” of peacetime emergencies and are not separate types (II.C)
  • Can be used in response to chemical, biological, or radiological terrorist incidents (Schumann
  • Applies to all threats or acts of terrorism within the U.S. (Sec. I. C.).
General Comments:
  1. Each plan has specific applications (oil and hazardous materials for the NCP, natural disasters for the FRP, radiological emergencies for the FRERP) that taken together provide a mosaic that covers most emergencies.  A new plan that utilizes the features of the existing plans and bridges them together is recommended.
  2. FRERP was issued before PDD-39 and needs to be updated to better address terrorist incidents.  Update has been initiated, but not completed.
  3. There appears to be some overlap between the NCP and FRERP that probably requires a little more operational reconciliation, i.e., what triggers which plan?
Identified Gap/Conflict/Issue:

  • The plans serve the programs they were designed, but gaps in coverage exist.
  • None of the plans contains detailed information on response to biological agents.
Recommendation:

  • A Biologic Response Plan is needed and is being developed by HHS.  There is also a need for  ESF #8 of the FRP to be strengthened.

 

 

 

Plan Features

NCP

FRP

FRERP

CONPLAN

  1. What is the trigger and process for plan activation?  Is a formal request from a state or local government necessary?
  • Any discharge of oil in U.S. navigable waters, shorelines, or other waters that could affect natural resources.
  • For any release of hazardous substances, pollutants or contaminants that may present danger to the public health or welfare. (Sec. 300.3).
  • No request is needed for activation.
  • Upon learning of a discharge, any person can notify NRC directly by telephone, or if unable to do so, the US Coast Guard, or the EPA-designated OSC for the area.  Once the NRC has received notification, it shall contact the OSC, which will notify the appropriate state agency, then proceed with its assessment and potential remediation of the situation (Section 100.125a; Section 300.300).

 

 

  • All major disasters and emergencies declared under the Stafford Act.
  • A state can request Federal assistance under the Stafford Act.  However, when FEMA receives initial notification from the FBO of a credible threat of terrorism, the Terrorism Annex directs FEMA to consult immediately with Governor’s office to determine whether to invoke Stafford Act.
  • Exception is if emergency involves area or facility under federal government authority or responsibility (Sec. II.A.).
  • The President must declare a major disaster or emergency and appoint an FCO, who will implement the FRP (NCP 300.125h-i).
  • Any peacetime radiological emergency that has actual, potential, or perceived radiological consequences within the U.S., its territories, or possessions (Sec. I. C.)
  • No request is needed for activation.  Federal agencies may take independent action.
  • Requests for Federal assistance may be made (Sec. I.D.)
  • Federal agencies may take independent actions to protect the public, minimize immediate hazards, and gather information about the emergency that might be lost by delay, within the limitations of their statutory authority;  State and local officials must generally be informed before any action.  In a few situations they may act without a request from State and local officials (Comment 5,6, Federal Register 61:90, 1996).
  • All threats or acts of terrorism within the U.S. (I. C.)
  • No request is needed for activation, however it does outline how requests for federal assistance should be made (Sec. II.F.).
  • CONPLAN focuses more on crisis management.
 

 

General Comments:
  1. There needs to be a threshold for activation of any integrated plan that is something less than a Presidential Declaration.   There are too many activations of the NCP for the President to be involved in each one.  Suggest a scheme similar to EPA’s Removal authority scale.  (e.g., $2M for OSC, $10M for Regional Administrator, more than $10M at DHLS; whatever the current numbers are.)
  2. The NCP and CONPLAN allow for a lower activation threshold that generally facilitates a more rapid response than the other plans. That may serve as a model for any integrated plan.
Identified Gap/Conflict/Issue:

Recommendation:

  • The FRP should be modified so that it is clear that the FRP response can be implemented without a Stafford Act declaration.  Currently, it is unclear that the FRP can be activated without a disaster declaration.
  • FRP structure should be used regardless of a Stafford Act declaration.

 

 

Plan Features

NCP

FRP

FRERP

CONPLAN

  1. Does the plan give the Federal government geographical jurisdictional control?

 

Do the Feds during the response provide a primary or support role to the states and locals?

  • For oil, FOSC is appointed to direct cleanup efforts in navigable waters, adjoining shorelines, or for potential incidents.
  • For chemicals, FOSC is appointed to direct response efforts for releases into the environment.  (Sec. 300.120).  DOD/DOE have jurisdiction for their facilities. (Nickle)
  • The role of the NIC for SONS should be included (USCG).
  • The President may, under the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, appoint a FCO to an [designated] (Nickle)  affected area to lead response activities.  No specific information on Federal government’s geographical jurisdictional control.
  • In certain instances occurring at nuclear facilities not licensed, owned, or operated by a Federal agency or an Agreement State, EPA is the LFA for any emergency at that facility wherever it may be.
  • There is no other particular information on geographical jurisdictional control as noted in Section II. B. (Determination of LFA)
  • Exceptions for National Defense Area or National Security Area (I.D.3) (Chrobak)
  • No specific information on Federal government’s geographical jurisdictional control; plan applies to incidents within the United States. (Sec. I.C.)
General Comments:
  1. Jurisdiction is based on underlying law authorizing the plan.  If we adjust these somehow, that will probably require Congressional action. (Nickle)
  2. Natural disaster should “belong” to the locals.  The Federal government serves best in a support role for the local response.(Smith)
  3. One of the geographic distinctions between the FRP and the NCP is that the FRP assigns a separate FCO to manage response in a State and may have to assign more than one FCO if an emergency impacts more than one state.  The NCP assigns a single OSC to an incident regardless of how many states are impacted (USCG).
  4. ***On hold until scenario discussion***  No comments because it’s on hold.
Identified Gap/Conflict/Issue:

Recommendation:

 

* I have not modified this issue because I am not sure if we are going to keep it.

Plan Features

NCP

FRP

FRERP

CONPLAN

4A.) Does the plan give the                    Federal government authority to direct response actions or is the Federal government in a support role to state/local government?
  • Federal government has authority to either lead  response or provide support to state/locals.
  • Acknowledges primary authority of Federal government for crisis management for terrorist incidents as outlined in the Terrorism Annex.
  • For consequence management, federal government generally is support role to state/locals.
  • Federal government has authority to take on-site actions for emergencies in areas under Federal control.  Federal government can be requested to support states/locals for all other emergencies.
  • Federal government has authority to direct response for crisis management.  Federal government supports state/locals for consequence management under FRP framework.
General Comments:
  • Do we want an umbrella plan to provide for either federal lead or stat/local support approach for consequence management (as the NCP provides, for example).  Workgroup should discuss.  (Schumann)
  • The FOSC has the ultimate decision-making authority.  However, what happens if an entire locality is wiped out?
Identified Gap/Conflict/Issue:

Recommendation:

 

Plan Features

NCP

FRP

FRERP

CONPLAN

  1. How does the plan apply to areas or facilities under Federal jurisdiction?
  • CERCLA 120(a) provides that each department, agency, and instrumentality of the United States (including the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government) shall be subject to, and comply with, this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and substantively, as any nongovernmental entity, including liability.
  •  Federal facilities can be placed on the NPL for cleanup and the NCP and E.O.s affords some oversight authority to EPA.
  • NCP addresses emergency responses at federal agencies (executive branch)
  • EPA and USCG generally provide OSCs for emergencies at federal agencies; federal agencies responsible for responding to non-emergencies.  Exception: DOD/DOE provide own OSC for all responses.
  • NCP does not separately address emergency responses at legislative/judicial properties.
  • If an emergency involves a facility under Federal jurisdiction, the President may unilaterally direct the provision of emergency assistance under the Stafford Act as noted in Section II. A.
  • FRP does not separately address emergency responses at legislative/judicial properties.
  • For emergencies involving an area under Federal jurisdiction, the responsibility for onsite actions belongs to a Federal agency, while offsite actions are the responsibility of the state or local government as noted in Section I. D. (Plan Considerations)
  • The Department of Justice is the LFA for off-site actions (as delegated by the FBI) until the Attorney General transfers the LFA role to FEMA.
  • FRERP does not separately address emergency responses at legislative/judicial properties.
  • The plan does not contain any information on how it applies to facilities under Federal jurisdiction.
General Comments:
  1. If a federal facility is involved in an emergency, then the plan should be applied as if it was a private facility.  Most of the restrictions in these plans for federal settings deal more with financial and security matters than in operational issues.  Allowances can be made for these without removing the support of the plan’s response infrastructure.
  2. Federal facilities are a very special subset of disaster responses.  When a federal facility is the only facility affected, the Federal government has great latitude in responding.
Identified Gap/Conflict/Issue:

  • At Capital Hill anthrax, the responding parties were not clear about the extent of their authorities at legislative/judicial sites.
Recommendation:

  • The plans, especially the FRP, need to identify their applicability to structures or properties under the control of the Legislative or Judicial branches of government and roles and responsibilities at these sites.

 

Plan Features

NCP

FRP

FRERP

CONPLAN

  1. Does the plan identify and describe who has the authority and ability to ensure that response workers are protected? Does the plan specifically address responder protection, what standards apply, and the development of a site health and safety plan?
  • In a response taken under the NCP by a lead agency, that agency is responsible for an occupational safety and health program at the site.  This plan must meet OSHA standards and state laws.  All governmental agencies and private employers are directly responsible for the health and safety of their own employees (Section 300.150).
  • In General, the NCP refers to OSHA regulations.
  • RP or LFA is responsible for enforcement.  (Sec. 300.150)
  • Yes, through the Occupational Safety and Health Annex.
  • OSHA standards apply
  • Signatory agencies are responsible for their own people.
  • FCO/DSO is responsible onsite.
  • The plan does not provide specific information on responder protection, standards for responder protection, authorities for enforcement, or a site health and safety plan.
  • The plan only discusses a situation when personal protective equipment (PPE) is not available.
  • The plan does not discuss standards, authorities for enforcement, or a site health and safety plan.
General Comments:
  1. The provisions regarding worker health & safety need to be strengthened for all the plans.
  2. OSHA standards on worker health and safety should apply for all responses.
  3. The unique work conditions to which workers, including first responders, could be exposed to during major incidents is significantly overlooked and is incorrectly included in the overall public safety issues.
  4. OSHA resources and expertise that can be utilized in both advisory and enforcement capacities are not specifically referenced in plans to be integrated in ICS/UC structure.
Identified Gap/Conflict/Issue:

  • Technical support for worker health and safety (WH&S) during incidents needs to be improved.
Recommendation:

  • OSHA should provide lead technical expertise and risk management for the protection of workers, and responder health and safety should be explicitly addressed in federal response plans.

 

 

Plan Features

NCP

FRP

FRERP

CONPLAN

  1. Does the plan define the role and responsibilities of all federal response elements?

 

  • The plan does address federal agencies that can provide support. (Sec. 300.175)

 

  • Within the particular ESFs, lead and support agencies and their responsibilities are listed.

 

  • The plan details the roles of the various Federal agencies that could respond and provides for an LFA.
  • Section I.D. outlines general responsibilities for federal authorities.
  • The plan outlines the roles of Federal agencies that provide core Federal response.
  • The plan also includes a chart on response organization with some written details. (ICS focused).
General Comments:
  1. Within the individual plans, there seems to be no problem with integration issues vertically across the different levels of government.  Problems arise when more than one plan is activated at the same time with the resulting multiple LFA’s.  That implies a horizontal integration problem.
  2. All Federal forces should respond under their own authorities with overall Federal coordination.  The Federal government cannot (should not) infringe on State or local authorities.
Identified Gap/Conflict/Issue:

  • The role of the federal “Lead” at National, Regional & On Scene levels is not clear in some plans
Recommendation:

  • The roles and responsibilities of the federal “Lead” at National, Regional & On Scene levels in a variety of situations needs to be decided as a policy matter and clarified in appropriate plans and documents.
  • The Nuclear Regulatory Commission and its role are not addressed in the CONPLAN.  This shortfall should be addressed.

 

Roles/responsibilities federal response elements- if we want to expand, this is extensive.

  • NCP:  USGC provides the NRT vice-chair, maintains continuously manned facilities for use in dealing with oil and hazmat discharges, and offers expertise in marine issues.  EPA chairs the NRT, provides predesignated OSCs for all inland areas for which it is required, gives expertise on human & ecological effects of discharges, pollution control techniques, and legal interpretive expertise.  FEMA provides hazmat/chemical/radiological preparedness expertise.  DOD deals with releases of vessels or facilities under its control  Within DOD, the US Army Corps of Engineers provides equipment and personnel to deal with engineering-related functions.  SUPSALV provides experience and equipment for ship salvage and diving.  DOE can deal with radiological issues, and provides  designated OSCs/RPMs that deal with releases.  USDA analyzes the impact of natural and man-made emergencies on natural resources.  DOC provides scientific support to emergency response in coastal and marine areas.  HHS protects human health services; within HHS the ATSDR and CDC respond to hazardous materials emergencies.  DOI provides expertise for the national park system and wildlife refuges, including biological and geological surveys, and mineral management knowledge.  DOJ advises on legal matters relating to discharges or releases.  DOL inspects sites to ensure worker safety.  DOT offers expertise on transportation of potentially hazardous materials.  Department of State leads in creating international joint contingency plans, and coordinates international emergency responses.  GSA provides logistic and telecommunications support to federal, state, and local agencies in an emergency.

 

  • FRP:  Each State has primary responsibility for law enforcement in a disaster or emergency;  if the State is unable to provide adequate response, it can request federal assistance.  The initial Federal group in the field is the ERT-A, headed by a team leader from FEMA, with representatives from selected ESF primary agencies.  Within the ESFs [I just put primary/support, not responsibilities bc I thought it would take way too much space.  But if you want it in I can put it in]:
    • ESF#1 (Transportation):  Primary DOT, support DOA, DOD, Dept of State, Dept of Treasury, FEMA, GSA, Tennessee Valley Authority, USPS.
    • ESF#2 (Communications):  Primary National Communications System, support DOA, DOC, DOD, DOI, FDC, FEMA, GSA.
    • ESF#3 (Public Works & Engineering):  Primary DOD, USACE, support DOA, DOC, DHHS, DOI, DOL, Dept of Veterans Affairs, EPA, Tennessee Valley Authority.
    • ESF#4 (Firefighting):  Primary DOA, Forest Services;  support DOC, DOD, DOI, EPA, FEMA.
    • ESF#5 (Information and Planning):  FEMA;  support DOA, DOC, DOD, Dept of Education, DOE, DHHS, DOI, DOJ, DOT, Dept of Treasury, American Red Cross, EPA, GSA, NASA, NCS, NRC, SBA, Civil Air Patrol, Voluntary Organizations.
    • ESF#6 (Mass Care):  Primary American Red Cross;  support DOA, DOD, DHHS, Dept of Housing and Urban Devt, Dept of Veterans Affairs, FEMA, GSA, USPS.
    • ESF#7 (Resource Support):  Primary General Services Administration, support DOA, CDOC, DOD, DOE, DOL, DOT, Dept of Veterans Affairs, FEMA, NASA, NCS, OPM.
    • ESF#8 (Health and Medical Services):  Primary DHHS, support DOA, DOD, DOE, DOJ, DOT, Dept of Veterans Affairs, Agency for International Devt (USAID?), American Red Cross, EPA, FEMA, SGA, NCS, USPS.
    • ESF#9 (Urban Search and Rescue):  Primary FEMA, support DOA, DOD, DHHS, DOJ, DOL, Agency for International Devt (USAID?), NASA.
    • ESF#10 (Hazardous Materials):  Primary EPA, support USCG, DOA, DOC, DOD, DOE, DHHS, DOI, DOJ, DOL, Dept of State, DOT, NRC.
    • ESF#11(Food):  Primary DOA, Food and Nutrition Service;  support DOD, DHHS, American Red Cross, EPA, FEMA, GSA.
    • ESF #12 (Energy):  Primary DOE, support DOA, DOD, DOI, Dept of State, DOT, NCS, NRC, Tennessee Valley Authority.

 

  • FRERP:  (see Table II-1)  For any emergency not under the control of a Federal agency, the State or local government is responsible for response;  the State may request help from Federal agencies but will maintain primary responsibility.  If the emergency is at a facility owned or operated by a federal agency, this agency is the LFA responsible for the response.  The NRC is the LFA for a licensed nuclear facility under NRC regulatory oversight, as well as for transportation of radioactive materials under NRC oversight.  If the facility is owned or operated by, or material is shipped by the DOD or DOE, that agency is the LFA in an emergency.  If the facility or shipped material is not licensed, owned, or operated by a federal agency or agreement state, the EPA is the LFA.  Satellites containing radioactive materials are to be handled by the agency that deployed them, i.e. NASA or DOD, with technical assistance from DOE and EPA.   In the event of radioactive material from a foreign or unknown source, EPA is the LFA with DOD, DOE, NASA, and NRC providing technical assistance.  In any other, unforeseen type of emergency, these federal agencies will confer as to which is the LFA:  DOD, DOE, EPA, NASA, and NRC.  The FBI will manage and direct the law enforcement and intelligence aspects of the response.

 

  • CONPLAN:  The Federal agencies that provide core Federal response are:  DOJ (lead agency for crisis management) to try to prevent domestic terrorist attacks and to prosecute such attacks that might occur.  The FBI will be the LFA and coordinate the emergency response;  DOD will provide support to the FBI for crisis management functions.  FEMA will be the lead agency for consequence management.  DOE, EPA, and DHHS will support the FBI for technical operations and support FEMA for consequence management.  Other Federal agencies not specifically named may be required to provide support.

 

Plan Features

NCP

FRP

FRERP

CONPLAN

7B.  Does the plan define the role and responsibilities of  state’s response elements?
  • State and local organizations are expected to initiate public safety measures and if necessary to direct evacuations according to state or local procedures.  One state representative will be chosen by the governor to represent the state on the RRT.  (Sec. 300.180)
  • No specific responsibilities for state and local responders are listed.
  • For an emergency at an area/facility not under Federal control, State and local governments have primary responsibility for protecting life, property, and the environment outside of the facility.  For all other emergencies, the State and local government must take emergency actions both onsite and offsite, with support as requested by Federal agencies.
  • :   By State law, the governor has full authority to implement the State’s emergency plan during a declared emergency.  State agencies must ensure that essential services and resources are available to local authorities and the Incident Commander.  State and local governments have primary responsibility for consequence management.
General Comments:
  1. Within the individual plans, there seems to be no problem with integration issues vertically across the different levels of government.(Nickle)
  2. Problems arise when more than one plan is activated at the same time with the resulting multiple LFA’s.  That implies a horizontal integration problem.(Nickle)
  3. All Federal forces should respond under their own authorities with overall Federal coordination.  The Federal government cannot (should not) infringe on State or local authorities. (Smith)
Identified Gap/Conflict/Issue:

Recommendation:

 

 

Plan Features

NCP

FRP

FRERP

CONPLAN

7C. Does the plan define the role and responsibilities of local response elements?
  • State and local organizations are expected to initiate public safety measures and if necessary to direct evacuations according to state or local procedures. (Sec. 300.180)
  • No specific responsibilities for local responders are listed.
  • For an emergency at an area/facility not under Federal control, State and local governments have primary responsibility for protecting life, property, and the environment outside of the facility. For all other emergencies, the State and local government must take emergency actions both onsite and offsite, with support as requested by Federal agencies.
  • A local Incident Commander will determine which local resources to deploy;  in most cases the Incident Commander will come from the State or local organization that has primary responsibility for managing the emergency.  When the emergency exceeds local resources, a Unified Command can evolve, incorporating multiple agencies;  requests for assistance are filled at the lowest possible level of government.  When State assistance is provided, the local government retains overall responsibility and command, except when State or Federal law decrees otherwise.  State and local governments have primary responsibility for consequence management.
 
General Comments:
Identified Gap/Conflict/Issue:

Recommendation:

 

 

Plan Features

NCP

FRP

FRERP

CONPLAN

7D. Does the plan define the role and responsibilities of the private sector?
  • Industry groups, academic organizations, and others are encouraged to commit resources for response operations.   ACP’s make procedures for well-organized, worthwhile, and safe use of volunteers.
  • All response actions (private sector included) can be found in Sections 300.300 and 300.400 series of the plan.
  • No responsibilities pertinent to the private sector are listed.
  • Federal agencies may coordinate with voluntary organizations that provide a wide variety of disaster relief goods and services.
  • The plan does outline some private sector responsibilities.
  • No components are applicable to industry. (Sec. IV)
General Comments:
Identified Gap/Conflict/Issue:

  • Private sector responsibilities & coordination are not addressed in most of the plans.
Recommendation:

  • Private sector responsibilities in prevention, preparedness & response needs to be included in the federal plans.

 

Plan Features

NCP

FRP

FRERP

CONPLAN

  1. Does the plan identify and describe the transfer of incident lead between local, state and federal organizations of the tactical control of response activities?
  • The general working of NCP operations unify local, State, and Federal groups, with the OSC maintaining control;  however, if the situation is beyond this group’s capability, the President may declare a major disaster or emergency and appoint a Federal Coordinating Officer to coordinate all federal disaster assistance activities;  in this case, FEMA may activate FRP (Section 300.125h).
  • No direct Federal assistance is authorized prior to a Presidential declaration.  FEMA can move Initial Response Resources and emergency teams closer to potentially affected areas, so that it will be able to respond quickly.  In addition, when an incident cannot be dealt with effectively by State or local governments, FEMA may request the DOD to perform any emergency work for the preservation of life and property under the Stafford Act (Section II, A3).
  • Discusses roles and responsibilities and coordination of response efforts, transition of response coordination between feds, but nothing about the transfer of authority between feds and locals.
  • Discusses various levels of response, but does not detail how a transfer will take place.
  • Under the plan, the Attorney General controls the transition between crisis and consequence management.
General Comments:
  1. This issue is, at its most basic, an interpersonal one.  That is, the agreement of the folks at the scene from the different agencies determines how well this function is performed.
  2. All Federal forces should respond under their own authorities with overall Federal coordination.  The Federal government cannot (should not) infringe on State or local authorities.
  3. Are we going to recommend plans include more info on transition process?  If so, can we provide any examples of the kinds of info that should be covered?
Identified Gap/Conflict/Issue:

Recommendation:

 

 

Plan Features

NCP

FRP

FRERP

CONPLAN

  1. Does the plan identify who is the lead agency responsible for planning and establishing response policy?
  • Responsibility for planning is given to mult-agency committees, rather than one lead agency.
  • EPA and USCG are responsible for NCP planning at all levels of the NRS (USCG).
  • NRT is responsible for national planning, includes federal agencies only  (Sec. 300.110).
  • RRT is responsible for regional planning, includes state and local agencies (Sec. 300.115).
  • Area Committees comprising federal, state, and local agencies shall prepare an ACP for their areas (described further in Sec 300.210), enhance contingency planning of federal, state, and local officials.  The SERC of each State designates emergency planning districts and appoints LEPCs.  LEPCs prepare a local emergency response plan for the emergency planning district.  (Section 30.200)
  • Roles and responsibilities of Federal agencies are outlined in Sec. 300.175.
  • Identifies FEMA as the lead agency for coordinating overall planning and disaster response/recovery under the FRP (Section II, A4;  Section IV, D1), unless the nature of the incident invokes another plan (NCP, FRERP, etc), in which case the appropriate LFA is designated (Section IV, V2).  Primary, support, and recovery agencies are responsible for planning and coordinating the delivery of disaster assistance.  Primary agencies are responsible for taking the lead in preparing and maintaining their specific ESF annex to the FRP.  Primary and support agencies and their responsibilities are listed in each of the ESFs, and in Q7 of the matrix.
  • The CDRG is similar in many respects to the NRT.
  • The plan details the roles of the various Federal agencies that could respond.
  • The plan provides for an LFA as noted in section II. B. (Determination of LFA).
  • Does not delineate who is the lead agency for planning/policy because each emergency is different, with a different LFA, so each agency must make its own plans.
  • DOJ, acting through the FBI, is the Lead Federal Agency (LFA), carries out the responsibilities as defined in the document. The plan further states that LFA responsibilities will transfer to FEMA after consultations among the AG, the FBI Director and the FEMA Director when law enforcement goals and objectives have been met and no further threats exist.  The plan further designates the FBI as the lead agency for crisis management actions) and FEMA as the lead agency for consequence management actions.  These lead responsibilities are per PDDs-39 and 62
  • Section IV details concept of operations for a coordinated response.
General Comments:
  1. The essence of all these plans is the collaborative planning function across several agencies.  This is something we should continue and the NRT process may be a model for this.  I understand the CDRG also collaborates on a regular basis and their process may also contribute to the design of any integrated plan.
  2. The system used by the FRP and ESFs works well.  The feature of having all agencies respond under their existing authorities should be preserved in any new Federal response paradigm.
Identified Gap/Conflict/Issue:

  • Situations exist where the federal lead for establishing response policy may be uncertain.
  • Issue:  CONPLAN and FRA Annex designate FBI as overall LFA for crisis management.  This may not be the desired role for them.  (Williams should provide language he’s comfortable with)
Recommendation:

  • DHS should have the responsibility to designates the lead Federal agency for every large-scale response.  This would give the Federal government a single voice in response operations. It would reduce initial confusion over who was the lead if OHS is always the lead.  OHS could then delegate responsibility for response and recovery to the most appropriate federal agency depending on the circumstances of the emergency. Giving DHS this authority would require a change in existing plans.
  • FBI, in consultation with OHS/DHS, should evaluate whether they are the appropriate agency to lead overall efforts for crisis mgt for terrorist incidents or whether they should focus primarily on law enforcement activities, and another agency should coordinate the overall response.
  • Clarify the primary technical support agencies for responding to a radiological incident and, if necessary, the process by which federal lead with be transitioned.

1)  Issue that is being included in OHS’s RDD working group efforts to try to sort out dirty bomb response issues:  confusion exists over which technical support agency–          DOE or EPA—has primary authority for cleanup under FRERP, PDD 62, and CONPLAN, and how the two agencies would work together (Schumann).

2)  Question:  What is the scope of this question?  Are we asking only about planning/ policy responsibilities (1) before a response, or (2) planning before the response, and policy during the response?  The answers under NCP clearly cover just he first, but not clear how that’s being interpreted for the other plan answers (Schumann).

 

Plan Features

NCP

FRP

FRERP

CONPLAN

  1. Is command and control and consequence management outlined in the plan?

Can we clarify question—is this about whether there is an ICS/UG-like response structure, or is this about having 2 phases of a response– crisis v. consequence?  Doesn’t Q15 cover the ICS/UC part?  Overlap between answers (Schumann).

  • Yes, though no details.
  • Refers to OSHA regulations.  How does this relate? (Schumann)
  • Answer here somewhat different than answer under Q15 (Schumann)
  • Yes. The plan discusses ICS in section IV of the Basic Plan (Concept of Operations).
  • Some additional details found in section IV. E. of the Basic Plan.
  • Consequence management discussed in Terrorism Annex.
  • No.  There is no mention of ICS or a command organization.
  • Yes.  The plan discusses ICS at the state and local level.
  • Though limited in content, it also discusses consequence and crisis management (Sec. IV.B.1 and 2.) Actually, this is about the only place that the difference in crisis and consequence management is of critical importance.(Nickle)
General Comments:
  1. Crisis and consequence management is mostly an artificial separation of response actions that seems to be of limited use during an actual response.  The one exception to that generality is when the separation of these actions involves a transition in LFA. (Nickle)
  2. The whole plan should be about consequence management as assistance is rendered to local forces in managing the consequences of a disaster. (Smith)
  3. What recommendation do we want to make about the current phasing- crisis vs. consequence—if it needs to be fixed, how?  WE know OHS wants to eliminate this distinction—do we agree?  How would plans work w/o it?  Should discuss.  We’re stil recommending under Q9 that as overall lead, DHS should identify the appropriate agency for response and recovery.  Are we thinking these could be 2 different agencies?  If so, is this still some remnant of crisis vs. consequence mgt distinction? (Schumann)
Identified Gap/Conflict/Issue:

  • The federal government does not have a uniform management system when responding.
Recommendation:

  • The plans should be explicit in using the ICS/UC system.  Tactical response management is currently not tied back to any of the plans.  The Federal Government should ensure training in and implementation of the ICS/UC so that it becomes the standard response system used whenever ESF #10 is activated, including WMD incidents.

 

 

 

Plan Features

NCP

FRP

FRERP

CONPLAN

  1. Does the plan identify a process for accessing or activating DoD resources?
General Comments:
Identified Gap/Conflict/Issue:

  • The interface and coordination between Homeland Security and Homeland Defense is unclear.
  • Need a clear way of requesting DoD assets.
  • Written agreements between states may be needed so National Guard assets can be shared.
  • Process for requesting and receiving DoD assets may change if it is a terrorist event.
Recommendation:

  • Closer coordination is needed with DOD.

 

 

Plan Features

NCP

FRP

FRERP

CONPLAN

  1. Does the plan identify a process for accessing or activating federal resources?
  • Yes – plan is activated for health and safety concerns.
  • FOSC directs responses to all spills.
  • Notification through NRC.
  • Requests through NRT and RRT (discussed in multiple sections).
  • Yes, through a Presidential declaration.
  • No details on how agencies would be activated, but each ESF outlines in its Concept of Operations section how to request additional assistance.
  • Support Agencies are designated in each ESF.
  • Yes.  It is turned on by directly contacting the Federal agencies listed in the Plan. (Sec. I.D.5.)
  • Yes, but no details. The plan explains it at a very high level.
General Comments:
  1. This is another situation where the process works all right within the individual plans, but tends to fall apart when applied across plans.  This is because the plans were written at different times with different goals and hence, different agreements between federal agencies.  These agreements should be re-negotiated for any integrated plan.
  2. This is what the coordination function for the Federal response is all about.  Taken together, the current plans do this.
  3. Assessing federal resources includes the federal special teams.  Under the NCP, federal assets are directly accessible to the FOSC without going through the RRT or NRT.
Identified Gap/Conflict/Issue:

  • How DHS will allocate resources that are not under its direct jurisdiction is unclear.
  • A layered authority
Recommendation:

  • The SONS model for proportioning resources based on the magnitude of an event should be adopted for all emergency responses.

 

Plan Features

NCP

FRP

FRERP

CONPLAN

  1. Does the plan provide a process for making decisions to allocate federal resources for competing demands?

 

  • Federal agencies should make available those facilities or resources that may be useful in a response situation, consistent with agency authorities and capabilities as noted in Sec. 300.105.
  • For oil spills, the NCP outlines a procedure for Spills of National Significance that meet this need.  This procedure does not apply to chemical incidents. (Citation)
  • The plan is inherently designed to deal with this through its organizational framework (Sec. I.C. and II.B.).
  • The level of Federal response will be based on the type and amount of radioactive material involved and the area and potential for impact of the spill.
  • There is no particular mention of any process for Federal resource allocation.
  • Multiple and competing requests will be managed based on priorities and objectives established by the JOC Command Group as noted in II. F.
General Comments:
  1. The SONS model from OPA is a potential model for dealing with these issues if all the kinks in that approach can be worked out.
  2. Under the NCP, the process for allocating federal resources is an iterative one, and inferred in 300.105 when they talk about the unified command response management principle.
Identified Gap/Conflict/Issue:

  • How DHS will allocate resources that are not under its direct jurisdiction is unclear.
  • A layered authority, similar to the Federal Response System,  that responds based on the magnitude of the event should be adopted.
Recommendation:

  • The SONS model for proportioning resources based on magnitude should be adopted for all emergency responses.  The flexibility of this model will help Federal agencies respond to geographically distinct and precedence-setting events in the future.

Explain the SONS model in more detail.

 

Plan Features

NCP

FRP

FRERP

CONPLAN

  1. Are sources of funding identified?  Are there restrictions on how these funds can be spent?
  • Yes, to a limited degree.  The process is outlined by the fund trustees, which is not included in the plan itself.
  • The plan includes very general information.
  • There is no information on FRP funding assistance (Sec. 300.335).
  • The Financial Management Annex provides information about funding.
  • Each agency is responsible for its own costs when participating in the response. (Sec. I.D.6)
  • The plan provides only basic information on funding.  Funding is the responsibility of each federal agency. (Sec. II.G.)
General Comments:
  1. The issue becomes whether the participating agencies have been allocated sufficient funds to deal with the potential crisis or whether additional finds are necessary.
  2. For incidents at federal facilities, all costs incurred during response and recovery of an incident should be paid by the agency responsible for the facility, unless otherwise directed by Congress.
Identified Gap/Conflict/Issue:

  • Gaps in funding response activities exist.
  • If Stafford Act funding is not provided for a large-scale terrorist incident, agencies may find that their existing funding is insufficient.
  • CERCLA does contain some exclusions on response authority (e.g., nuclear power plant incidents) that could preclude use of CERCLA response.   If alternative Stafford Act funding were not provided for such responses, would be a gap.
  • Funding, especially for pre-positioning of equipment in response to a received threat, is not addressed in the plans.
  • Procurement and contracting issues associated with funding also need to be examined as DHS is created.
Recommendation:

  • Develop legislation or policy to address shortfalls and coordination of funding (Stafford Act, CERCLA, Oil Pollution Fund).

Should clarify that for NCP, funding authority is provided by CERCLA and can only be spent for responses authorized under CERCLA (cross-reference exclusions in Q2), for FRP, funding authority provided by Stafford Act and requires Pres. Decl, and for FRERP and CONPLAN, should say no independent funding source provided, that agencies all responsible for their own costs (Schumann).

 

Price Anderson Act needs to be research for the FRERP column.

Plan Features

NCP

FRP

FRERP

CONPLAN

  1. Are sources of funding for preparedness activities identified? 
General Comments:
Identified Gap/Conflict/Issue:

  • Gaps in funding preparedness activities exist.
Recommendation:

  • Clarify the funding stream for preparedness activities.

 

Plan Features

NCP

FRP

FRERP

CONPLAN

  1. Does the plan identify special teams and how to obtain their assistance?
  • Yes, but very limited in the type/number of special teams identified (Sec. 300.145).
  • No specific section on special teams.
  • Special teams are addressed in ESF #10 and indirectly thru discussion of the NCP.
  • There are the NEST teams, the RAP Teams, and the RERT.
  • No, the plan does not provide information about special teams.
General Comments:
  1. The importance of special teams is that not all agencies and all regions need to develop all the capabilities to deal with all conceivable special situations.  These special teams provide that capability.
  2. Federal coordinator should have access to all Federal response assets and teams.
  3. This is another situation where the process works all right within the individual plans, but tends to fall apart when applied across plans.  This is because the plans were written at different times with different goals and hence, different agreements between federal agencies.  These agreements should be re-negotiated for any integrated plan.
  4. Assessing federal resources includes the federal special teams.  Under the NCP, federal assets are directly accessible to the FOSC without going through the RRT or NRT.
Identified Gap/Conflict/Issue:

  • None of the plans include a “special team for dealing with biologic terrorism event”
Recommendation:

  • Create a Biologic Response Team. There is no special team for dealing with biologic terrorism event.  A special, cross-agency technical team may be needed to deal with bioagents that have both an environmental component and bioagents that do not have an environmental component.

 

 

Plan Features

NCP

FRP

FRERP

CONPLAN

16A.  Does the plan identify a special team for biological hazards?
  • No
  • No
  • No
  • No
General Comments:
Identified Gap/Conflict/Issue:

  • None of the plans include a “special team for dealing with biologic terrorism event”
Recommendation:

  • Create a Biologic Response Team. There is no special team for dealing with biologic terrorism event.  A special, cross-agency technical team may be needed to deal with bioagents that have both an environmental component and bioagents that do not have an environmental component.
  • A Biologic Response Plan is needed and is being developed by HHS.  There is also a need for for ESF #8 of the FRP to be strengthened.

 

Plan Features

NCP

FRP

FRERP

CONPLAN

  1. Does the plan include a NIIMS ICS for onsite management, and if it does not, does it describe another type of response management system (for planning, ops, logistics, admin/finance, safety, etc.)?
  • The plan does not talk about details of the RMS/ICS.
  • The plan does mention the use of UC (Sec. 300.105).
  • The plan discusses ICS and its organization in Section IV of the Basic Plan.
  • Emergency response teams are organized under ICS concepts.
  • No, the plan does not talk about details of the RMS/ICS.
  • The plan does include information on JIC and public information coordination.
The plan briefly discusses ICS/UC, though it does not include details of the RMS/ICS
General Comments:
  1. In most respects, when these plans lack details, it is to allow for the maximum flexibility for LFA reps on the scene of the incident to fill in the details.  While this flexibility at the scene is an important concept to maintain, it may be important to specify the use of ICS and mandate training according to a standard curriculum across agencies.
  2. ICS/UC should be the mode of operation for the Federal government since the States and locals will be operating under an ICS system.
Identified Gap/Conflict/Issue:

  • The federal government does not have a uniform “on scene” management system for emergency response.
Recommendation:

  • NIIMS based ICS/UC should be adopted nationally by federal government as the “on scene” management system.

 

 

Plan Features

NCP

FRP

FRERP

CONPLAN

  1. Does the plan identify how it relates and interacts with other existing federal response plans?
  • The NCP applies to and is in effect when the FRP and some or all of its ESFs are activated as noted in Sec. 300.3.   NCP reference the FRERP?
  • The FRP may be implemented concurrently with the FRERP and NCP. (Sec. I.C.5. & IV.B.)
  • FEMA is responsible for coordinating non-radiological support using the structure of the FRP.
  • This plan is not intended to supersede existing plans, rather it is a coordinating plan.
General Comments:
  1. Each plan needs to contain a section on how it interacts with the other plans; hopefully, the sections in each plan will be compatible with each other.  (e.g., the FRP section on the NCP has to match the NCP section on the FRP.).  Since the briefing by OHS infers only the emergency response functions of the plans will be pulled into any integrated plan, all of these plans with longer term functions will remain in existence.
Identified Gap/Conflict/Issue:

  • The plans serve the programs they were designed for, but gaps in their relationships exist.
Recommendation:

  • Develop a “One Plan” document that clearly lays out the relationships, reconciles the differences, covers the gaps, and bridges, but does not reinvent, the FRP, NCP, FRERP & CONPLAN.

 

 

Plan Features

NCP

FRP

FRERP

CONPLAN

  1. Does the plan identify response priorities (e.g., law enforcement, public health, workers safety, environment) or the process of identifying the priorities?
  • Yes. Sections deal with national response priorities and general patterns of response (Sec. 300.317).
  • No, there is no mention of response priorities.
  • No, there is no mention of response priorities.
  • There is a short paragraph on the importance of evidence collection and securing a crime scene.
  • There are also some details on identifying response priorities in Section II.H.
General Comments:
  1. All the plans should explicitly state that human health is the first priority. Beyond that, the priorities in the plans should reflect their underlying legislative mandates.
  2. Response priorities will depend on the incident and should be set by the local first responders or by Unified Command in very large incidents.
Identified Gap/Conflict/Issue:

Recommendation:

 

 

Plan Features

NCP

FRP

FRERP

CONPLAN

  1. Is there a communications component to the plan that provides for timely communications to all external elements (e.g., the media and the public)?
  • Communications are discussed, though only as part of the notification requirements section and other sections.
  • There no dedicated section.
  • Through ESF 2 (infrastructure) and ESF 5 (information and planning). Outreach and information dissemination is outlined in Sec. II.C.
  • Section on Public Information Coordination talks about joint information, roles of the lead federal agency and other agencies. (Sec. II.D.6.)
  • There is no formal section in the plan.
  • There is a short paragraph as part of the lead agency responsibilities (Sec. III.D.)
  • The plan mentions the use of the JIC as part of some agency responsibilities.
General Comments:
  1. All of the plans should be updated to advocate the JIC approach.
  2. Communications with the public is significantly different than communications with the media in both format and amount of specificity.
  3. The timely communication of information to the public should be a function in incident command.
Identified Gap/Conflict/Issue:

  • Protocols on public information from the federal government is not consistent.
Recommendation:

 

 

Plan Features

NCP

FRP

FRERP

CONPLAN

  1. Does the plan include procedures for handling and processing secure information systems or equipment?  Does the plan include personnel security procedures at the scene of an incident?
  • No, there is no specific information on these procedures.

 

  • No, there is no specific information on these procedures.
  • No, there is no specific information on these procedures; however, there are some procedures inherent in the types of materials involved outside the scope of  plan.
  • No, there is no specific information on these procedures.
General Comments:
  1. A standard curriculum dealing with ESI, FOUO,  FOIA, Privacy Act, and CBI information should be developed nationally.
  2. Each agency should implement a training program of responders in line with the national curriculum.
  3. Each agency with responders should be encouraged to develop response clothing uniquely identifying them with their agencies.
  4. Standard ID badges across government should specify the employee’s clearance for each sensitive area above to allow for easy confirmation of access at the scene.
  5. The objective in a response operation should be to insure that all responders have accurate and timely information about the objectives of the risks associated with the operation.  To withhold information from responders places their lives at risk.
Identified Gap/Conflict/Issue:

Recommendation:

 

 

Plan Features

NCP

FRP

FRERP

CONPLAN

  1. How does the plan refer to the head federal agency?
General Comments:
Identified Gap/Conflict/Issue:

Recommendation:

  • All terminology should be consistent across all plans.  Currently, there are numerous designations that refer to the same person/entity (e.g., LFA, FOSC, FCO, etc.)

 

 

Plan Features

NCP

FRP

FRERP

CONPLAN

  1. How do the plans address data management/data sharing?
General Comments:
Identified Gap/Conflict/Issue:

Recommendation:

  • The plans do not address integrated data management/sharing.  Currently, for example, clinical data and environmental data are handled separately.  Data management and data sharing should also be tied to public emergency communications so that the appropriate message is conveyed to the public.

 

 

APPENDIX II – Response Layers

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

              Lead Agency                         FEMA                            AG/OHS               Lead Agency

 

  

                 NRT                                   CDRG                       CDRG + SIOC            LFA  / HQ EOC

 

 
                                                            EST

 

 
                 RRT                                   RISC                                  NRT                          ROC

 

 
                                                                                                                                                            

                                                            ROC

 

 
                 AC                                                                                 JOC                JOC     FRMAC

                 (FOSC)                                                                                                   (LFA/OSC)

 

 

                                                            DFO

                                                            (FCO)

 

 

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